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Abstract: The modern resurgence of orthodoxy in Anglican circles takes 
as its cardinal tenet the eternal coinherence of three persons in the one 
Godhead, equal in substance, rank and power. This is assumed to be the 
doctrine of the Nicene Council of 325, and the putative heresy that denies 
it is known by the term subordinationism. Although the ample lexicon of 
Greek heresiology supplies no clear antecedent for this term, the charge of 
subordinationism is thought to imperil any claim to be teaching in the 
catholic tradition, even if the teacher is Barth or Rahner. The confidence 
with which these accusations are levelled, however, seems to be in an 
inverse ratio to the accuser’s knowledge of history, for neither in New 
Testament scholarship nor at the cutting edge of the modern study of 
patristics will one find much evidence that subordinationism is even an 
anomaly, let alone an aberration from the biblical or conciliar norm. It is 
only in modern theology, not in the writings of empirical historians, that 
the Gorgon’s head of Arius is held up to those who question the strict 
equality of persons. At the same time, we must not forget that the 
systematician’s reading of Nicaea was until recently also that of the 
historian. No doubt the reason is partly that until the last half–century 
every historian was also a confessional theologian; but there is also a 
certain truth in the older approach so long as some pains are taken to 
define “subordination”. 
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My purpose in this essay is therefore to ascertain in what sense orthodox writers 
have rejected, and in what sense they have condoned, the subordination of God 
the Son to God the Father. According to my taxonomy, subordination will be 
 
(a) ontological when it ascribes to the Son a substance, nature or essence 
which is inferior to the Father’s;  
(b) aetiological when it asserts the Son’s posteriority in the order of causation;  
(c) axiological when it degrades him in rank or status without denying his 




(d) economic when it dates the subservience of the Son to the Father from 
some point after his origin, most commonly from his voluntary 
assumption of human nature. 
 
I shall begin by collating the texts that have commonly been cited from the New 
Testament either in favour of or against the equalisation of the three persons; 
after reviewing the doctrines of the early church (which of course were not 
independent of these texts1) I shall examine the use that was made of them in the 
Bible and the Fathers by three seminal writers in the English tradition. Milton 
will represent the Bibliolatrous extreme of Protestant thought, Cudworth the 
characteristically Anglican tempering of theology by philosophy, and Bull the 
attempt of an independent mind to perfect the alignment between the Church of 
England and the early saints whom it claimed for its own. 
 
1. Biblical Testimonies 
 
All oecumenical councils profess to be faithful to the scriptures, and even when 
they invoke patristic authorities, they invoke them as interpreters of scripture, 
not as independent vessels of revelation. It is not my object here to present my 
own appraisal of the scriptural evidence, but to offer an inventory of the texts 
that have been employed in debate throughout the centuries—and thereby to 
show, as I hope, that we cannot get behind tradition by asking the Bible itself to 
give us a simple affirmative or negative to the question “Is Christ God?” A 
detailed review of scholarship would leave no room for discussion of the Fathers 
and their successors, but it should at least be clear that we need not imitate the 
scholarship of the last century in tracing subordinationism to Plato (Chadwick 
1966, 15–16), together with any other element in ante–Nicene thought that is 
deemed to fall short of orthodoxy; I shall leave it to Cudworth to put the opposite 
case, that the Platonists were both better thinkers and better Christians than some 
accredited doctors of the church.  
There is little in the New Testament to suggest that the Son is equal to the 
Father, and not even an explicit assertion of their coeternity. The Word (not yet 
called the Son) was with the Father in the beginning (John 1.1)—an expression 
which takes us no further back than the origin of the world, perhaps no more 
than four thousand years before the incarnation on a strict construal of biblical 
chronology. He (or should we say “it”?2) is said to be theos, but the absence of the 
 
1 Patristic citations can be verified conveniently in relevant volumes of the Library of the Ante–
Nicene Fathers and Library of the Nicene and Post–Nicene Fathers, both edited by Philip Schaff 
and constantly reprinted by Eerdmans. 
2 Against the view that John was proclaiming a “pre–existent Jesus” see Dunn (1989, 213–250). 
Contrast L. Hurtado (2005, 118–121). 




definite article—used in the previous clause when the subject is God the Father– 
permits, or may even embolden, us to take this usage of theos as predicative rather 
than denominative. The New English Bible captures this well in its rendering 
“what God was the word was”, and the closest parallel in the Bible itself is 
Exodus 7.1, “I shall make thee theos to Pharaoh”, where the implication is 
evidently that Moses will be all that Pharaoh knows of God, not that he will be 
God in substance. There is no other passage in which the word theos is 
incontrovertibly applied to the Son: even Thomas’s exclamation “My Lord and 
my God” (John 20.28) is understood by a minority of readers as a prayer of 
thanksgiving rather than an apostrophe to the resurrected Jesus.3 Again, it is not 
uncommon to take “God over all, blessed for ever” at Romans 9.5 as an elliptical 
benediction of the Father, rather than as an honorific phrase in apposition to the 
name Christ. Most scholars prefer the variant “He was manifest in flesh” to “God 
was manifest in flesh” at 1Timothy 3.16; opinion is more divided as to whether 
Acts 20.28 should be understood to say that God shed “his own blood” for our 
salvation or that he shed “the blood of his own.  It is not clear whether Titus 2.13 
acclaims one being, our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, or whether “our God” is 
its first subject and “our Saviour Christ” the second. Nor is it certain whether the 
Son or the Father is the antecedent of “He is the one true God” at 1 John 5.20 (cf. 
Westcott 1892, 186–187); there is of course no doubt that it is the Son who confers 
this title upon the Father at John 17.3. 
The Son declares throughout the Gospel of John that he performs the works of 
his Father (10.37), that what he sees the Father doing he himself does likewise 
(5.19), and that therefore he has a testimony from the Father which is stronger 
than that of any human witness (5.32–36). There is no corresponding testimony 
of the Son to the Father, nor any hint that the Father imitates the works of the 
Son. If the asseveration “I and the Father are one” (John 10.30) were a claim to be 
of one substance with the Father, why should not the same inference be drawn 
from Paul’s saying that “he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit” (1 Corinthians 
6.17)?4 On the other hand, John 14.28, “the Father is greater than I”, is an 
unmistakable admission of inferiority (cf. Barrett 1974). Tertullian quotes it in 
triumph to prove that the Son is not identical with the Father (Against Praxeas 
9.2); Athanasius, taking “greater” to signify “causally prior”, embraces it as a 
scriptural proof that the Son is of one nature with the Father, as we do not engage 
in quantitative comparisons between beings of different natures (Against the 
Arians 1.58). Gregory Nazianzen, while admitting that the Father is the cause of 
the Son, maintains that it is not this aetiological dependence but the Son’s 
 
3 For this gloss in Theodore of Mopsuestia’s Commentary on John, see Behr (2011, 372). 




voluntary assumption of a creaturely state that justifies the term “greater”: the 
Son is inferior insofar as he wills to be sent and to serve.5 
Thus there are scriptural texts that can be construed as ascribing to divinity to 
Christ, and others that represent him as the Father’s willing servant in his 
ministry on earth. His economic subordination is the heart of the gospel; of 
ontological, aetiological or axiological subordination nothing is said and little can 
be deduced, because it did not seem to the prophets and apostles that such 
metaphysical questions have any bearing on our salvation. Those exegetes whom 
we now know as the Church Fathers find it necessary to treat of them, and in the 
next two sections we shall see how it became as much a note of catholicity to 
affirm the causal priority of the Father as to deny the Son’s inferiority to him 
either in essence or in rank. 
 
2. The Church before Nicaea 
 
Once it is understood that the true distinction is not between the manhood and 
the Godhead but between the Godhead incarnate and the Godhead in itself, the 
objection that Gregory’s “partitive exegesis” threatens the unity of Christ is no 
longer valid; in fact it preserves the narrative form of the Nicene Creed, which 
commemorates not the union of two antecedent natures but the miracle of God’s 
becoming man. Nevertheless, this theory eluded the church before Nicaea, which 
tends to posit not the nativity but the incarnation as the great caesura in the 
existence of the Second Person. Emergence from the Father (assumed to be a 
transition, not an eternal generation) establishes not only his distinctness but his 
finitude in contrast to the infinite transcendence of the one who is truly God. 
Justin explains that God the Father creates, administers and redeems the world 
through his Son because he cannot enter it himself, whereas the Son is of a nature 
that can admit of limitation (Dialogue with Trypho 60): his apparitions to Abraham, 
where he takes on the angelic role without forfeiting his divinity , reveal his 
subaltern character as clearly as his acceptance of the Cross (Trypho 55–56).  
Tertullian, who affirms not only that the Son is divine but that he and the 
Father are of one substance, appears to think it self–evidently blasphemous to 
suppose that the Father could have undergone the crucifixion (Against Praxeas 1.1 
etc.). While neither position lends itself to precise formulation, that of Justin tends 
to an ontological, and that of Tertullian to an axiological subordination of the Son 
to the Father.  His task, like that of all writers in the catholic tradition of Christian 
thought, is to account for the paradoxical worship of a second being in a faith 
that proclaimed the unity of God. The monarchian or Sabellian way of declaring 
the Son to be merely the Father’s human incognito is closed to him; so is that of 
 
5 Gregory Nazizanzen, Theological Orations 29.18 and 30.7.  




the Gnostics, Valentinian and Marcionites, who each in their own manner set one 
deity over creation and one over redemption, pronouncing the former in some 
degree inimical to the second. If the church found itself honouring two subjects, 
both called God, it could sustain its monotheism by holding one to be God in the 
true sense and the other only in a derived or less perfect sense. 
Much more representative of his time, and thus more odious to the champions 
of orthodoxy in the fourth century, was Origen, the first critic to draw the 
distinction explained above, between theos with the definite article and theos in 
its predicative application. Yet Origen in his own time was suspected of 
preaching two gods rather than one because he affirmed the second person to be 
coeternal with the first, a position held to be irreconcilable with the naming of 
one as Son and one as Father.6 Inasmuch as it awards a higher mode of being to 
the Father, his is not merely an aetiological but an ontological subordination; 
axiological subordination is clearly attested when he stipulates in his treatise On 
Prayer that the prayer of adoration should be addressed to the Father alone (15.1). 
Whether he is explaining or correcting the prevalent custom we cannot say, but 
he is evidently speaking in his own vocabulary when he adds that the Son differs 
both in hypokeimenon and in ousia from the Father. The first term should be 
rendered as “subject” if it refers to the pre–incarnate Son; if it has the sense of 
“substrate”, i.e. matter, it implies that the Son is not exempt in heaven from the 
economic subservience which he accepted when he took flesh. Since he affirms 
elsewhere that the Son and the Father share a nature, the term ousia is best 
understood in the sense of “concrete being” rather than “essence”, in which case 
subordination in any of the four modes specified above may be implied.  
He continued to describe the birth of the Son as an emanation—no longer 
temporal, as in the apologists, but eternal—and for this he was denounced as a 
Valentinian. Later generations took offence not at these passages but at his 
likening of the Son to a finite image of the immeasurable (First Principles 1.2.8), 
and at his statement that the Father presides over all things in creation, the Son 
only over those endowed with reason. The first simile implies that he lacks 
something of the Father’s nature, the second that he lacks something of his 
power. But what does he understand by the biblical dictum that the Son is the 
Father’s image? Paul at Colossians 1.15 is most probably speaking of the 
incarnate Christ as the image of the invisible God, whereas Origen adds the 
adjective “invisible” to “image” also, thereby intimating that the Son is the 
Father’s image even within the Trinity. And yet he goes on to speak of this same 
image as having shown his obedience even to the Cross. We cannot be sure, then, 
whether the Son is inferior to the Father as Second Person of the Trinity or only 
 
6 See Pamphilus, Apology for Origen 94–108, in the edition of G. Rowekamp (2005). Sonship is 
reconciled with coeternity when we posit an “eternal generation”, but this phrase perhaps 




as Christ enfleshed. The question that was of such consequence after Nicaea—is 
the subordination economic or ontological? —does not seem to have exercised 
the most tenacious theologian of the third century.  
 
3. Nicaea and after 
 
Arius broke with Origen and the apologists by denying that the Son had come 
forth from the Father, thereby weakening the analogy with human sonship. He 
may have purported to strengthen it by declaring that “before he was begotten 
or created he was not”—that is, he existed neither within the Father nor as a 
discrete hypostasis; the church after Origen, however, was not prepared to set 
limits to the longevity of the Son, and still less to admit that, like the world, he 
was “out of nothing”, even if Arius urged that no other formula would preserve 
the integrity of the Father’s substance. Therefore both “he was not” and “out of 
nothing” are anathematised on the Nicene Creed of 325; the assertion that the 
Son is “true God from true God” implies that the Father is the subject of John 17.3 
and the Son of I John 5.20. The adjective homoousios, together with the assertion 
that the Son is “from the ousia of the Father” preclude ontological subordination;   
neither in its original form, however, nor in the augmented version of 381 which 
is now used more familiar, does the creed state that the two persons are equal in 
rank, and the aetiological priority of the Father is asserted in all three times.  
Athanasius, whose championship of the Creed also determined its 
interpretation for centuries, admits the aetiological subordination of the Son to 
the Father in the exegesis of John 14.28 which is quoted above. Axiological 
subordination is precluded by his rejoinder, to those who urge that the Son is an 
image of the Father, that the image of the Emperor is worthy of the same honour 
as the Emperor himself (Against the Arians 3.6). Although this biblical metaphor, 
if not restricted to the earthly ministry, implies ontological subordination, 
Athanasius grants it here for the sake of his argument; elsewhere he upholds the 
formula “from the ousia” and the adjective homoousios with a zeal that leaves us 
in no doubt of his hostility to ontological subordination.   It has been remarked 
none the less that he employs the term homoousios always of the Son in relation 
to the Father, never of the Father in relation to the Son. While isotês (equality) is 
a salient term in his vocabulary, it never denotes more than possession of the 
same nature. After all, the Son owes his homoousiotês to his being from the ousia 
of the Father: the act of generation is not reversible, and as Apollinarius was later 
to inform Basil, the Trinity is one God because the Son and the Holy Spirit owe 
their being, and the nature of that being, to the Father, with whom they are one 
as a race or tribe is one with its progenitor (Basil, Letters 361–164).  
As an argument against Arius Athanasius urges that the church offers prayers 
to Christ, and so he cannot be less than God (Against the Arians 3.12). His 




argument makes no allusion to any such curtailment of these orisons as Origen 
prescribes in his treatise On Prayer. The question is not for him only a 
metaphysical one, for if Christ were not God in the full sense, he alleges, we could 
not become gods, as the gospel promises, by participation in his nature (Against 
the Arians 2.69–700. This reasoning is questionable, for the sense in which the 
saints are to be gods is not the sense in which the Father is God, and hence it 
might be possible for one who is less than the Father to impart such divinity is 
we can receive. Cappadocians too enjoin that equal honours be paid to the Son is 
the image of the Father—so equal that whenever they assert that the eternal Son 
is the “image” of the Father, they add a caveat against taking “image” in its usual 
acceptation. Thus Basil urges at On the Holy Spirit 45 that the Son possesses by 
nature the likeness to his Original that a statue possesses only by imitation, while 
Gregory Nazianzen, at Oration 30.20, contrasts the common statue, which is a 
“motionless imitation of the immobile”, with the Son who is the “living 
reproduction of Him who has life”.7  
Yet Gregory of Nyssa is wholly at one with Athanasius in holding that the only 
ground of difference within the Godhead, the causal primacy of the Father, is also 
the precondition of its unity.8 If there were no such bond they would be mere 
instantiations of a common species, and no reason could be given why there 
might not be two or four. It was in this respect that homoousian differed from 
homoiousian doctrine.9 The substitution of the fictitious watchword homoiousios 
(cf. Barnes 2006) for the phrase in use, homoios kat’ ousian, has given rise to the 
erroneous notion that its proponents taught a similarity, rather than an identity, 
of nature. The formula was designed, however, not to diminish Christ’s likeness 
to the Father but to intimate that, however like, the Father and the Son were not 
one subject, as a heretic might infer from the prefix homo–. If we mean by ousia 
the ensemble of attributes which, according to some logicians, constitutes a 
species, the two were certainly understood to be members of the same species 
and hence to be “like” inasmuch as they had the same essential attributes. The 
Nicene party resists this theory because it obscures the derivation of the Son and 
Spirit from the Father; their most intransigent adversaries, known as Anomoeans 
because they admitted no likeness of nature between the persons, agreed with 
 
7 The Cappadocians will have been aware of Aristotle’s observation, on the first page of the 
Categories, that a statue differs from its prototype in the definition of its being (logos tês ousias).  
8 See further Zizioulas (1985). On the licence with which he interprets both western and 
Cappadocian traditions, see Ludlow (2007, 52–68). 
9 See further Edwards (2009, 122–124), quoting Marius Victorinus, Against the Arians 1.29 
(Locher 1976, 63): “You say that both Father and Son are homoiousios. Which is like to which? The 
Son to the Father, in dignity and dignity of nomenclature? But so indeed the Father to the Son; 




them in regarding the Homoiousian, rather than the Homoousian, position, as 
the one that implies complete equality.10 
Augustine’s work On the Trinity opposed both the Anomoeans and the 
Homoians who confessed likeness but with no mention of ousia. He has been 
commended (in the west) for ridding theology of the Platonic malaise of 
subordinationism, chiefly on the grounds, that by acknowledging the Son’s role 
in the production of the Spirit and the Spirit’s role in cementing the love of the 
Father and the Son,11 he has grounded the unity of the Godhead in the mutual 
relations of the three persons rather than in the primacy of the Father.  Unfriendly 
critics object that in his wake the western tradition has tended to think of the 
Godhead as an abstraction which is logically anterior to the persons (cf. Zizioulas 
1985, 40). He himself is clearly not chargeable with this error, for he stipulates 
that divinity, the essence of God, is nothing other than God (On the Trinity 
5.11.12).  He also implies that aetiological precedence entails economic primacy, 
repeatedly observing that the Son, not the Father, is the one who is sent, and that 
the Father, not the Son, is the one revealed (cf. Gioia 2008, 78–83). The model of 
God as species which he rejects is the homoiousian one which the Cappadocians 
too had perceived (if not so clearly as he did) to be in need of correction (On the 
Trinity 5.11.12). Thus the aetiological priority of the Father is axiomatic to his 
doctrine of the Trinity; on the other hand, he offers no purchase to either the 
axiological or the ontological modes of subordination, for it is only in the flesh 
that the Son is “sent” to “reveal” the Father. The epiphanies to the patriarchs, 
which Justin and others attributed to the Son alone as the image of the Father, are 
explained by the mature Augustine either as angelophanies or as apparitions of 
all three persons together, since no one of them is more disposed by nature than 
the others to be seen by the human eye (On the Trinity 2.16.27–2.18.33; 3.11.78–
83). 
 
4. The Protestant Revolution 
 
An admirer of Augustine opined that his Trinitarian doctrine was in substance 
that of Calvin, though only the latter was bold enough to declare that each of the 
persons is autotheos, equally divine.12 For those who embraced the Protestant 
Reformation, it entailed above all a renunciation of Papal sovereignty, together 
with any article of teaching, whether ethical, liturgical or doctrinal, which was 
supported only by the authority of the Papal church and not by the testimony of 
 
10 Thus the “Anomoean” Eunomius, Liber Apologeticus 26.23–24, in Vaggione (1983, 70): 
“neither homoousios nor homoiousios, seeing that the former connotes generation and division of 
the substance, the latter equality” (my translation).  
11 See On the Trinity 8.10.14 etc., with Chadwick (1966, 16).   
12 Warfield (1956, 272–284). For Calvin I have used Beveridge (1989).   




scripture. Of course there was not universal agreement as to what was taught in 
scripture, nor indeed as to what should be taught as scripture, for there was 
obviously some force in the Papal argument that neither the Old Testament nor 
the New had drawn up a canon of its own contents. The decision of Calvin and 
of every church that shows his influence was to adopt the Jewish canon of the 
Old Testament (thus excising all that was extant only in Greek) and all the Greek 
texts that were customarily held to comprise the New Testament, 
notwithstanding Luther’s strictures on Hebrews, James and Revelation. The 
Lutheran churches in fact concurred, as did the 39 Articles of the Church of 
England. Whereas Calvin, however, held that a genuine work of inspiration 
commends itself to those who possess the light from above, the English tradition 
seems to have given more credit to the argument that there cannot be a canon 
without a church. It was therefore enshrined in English law that, while scripture 
teaches all things necessary to salvation, heresy is defined not only by scripture 
but by the teaching of the first four oecumenical councils. The apparent 
contradiction is mitigated by the principle that the Fathers have no independent 
authority, but only as interpreters of the texts which they themselves had 
pronounced to be normative (cf. Quantin 2009). It was indeed the Fathers who 
formed the court, although the law might speak of councils, not only because 
exegesis was the province of individuals, but because conciliar dogmas, until 
interpreted by these individuals, were almost as ambiguous as the scriptures. 
None of the first four councils, after all, decrees that the Holy Spirit is 
consubstantial with the other persons of the Trinity, or even that he is divine. 
The united suffrage of the four doctors– Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine and 
Gregory the Great—was sufficient for Rome, if less so for Canterbury; but in fact 
both Rome and Canterbury were willing to receive their doctrines in the more 
epigrammatic words of a Creed that was ascribed to Athanasius himself (cf. Kelly 
1964). While it lacks a Greek prototype and does not appear in any eastern 
liturgies, it is clearly the work of a gifted hymnodist and metaphysician who was 
able to say in a series of euphonious antitheses what the creeds of 325 and 381 
had failed to enunciate: that while none of the three persons is another person, 
each is wholly identical with the one being who is God. “The Father is God, the 
Son is God and the Spirit is God; and yet there are not three gods but one God”—
and so on without division of substance or confusion of persons. Calvin, in a 
famous wrangle, doubted whether anyone could be saved if their lot depended 
on a perfect recital of this formulary (cf. McNeill 1967, 141–142; Barth 1961, 417); 
nevertheless, it plainly informs his own argument that the name Jahweh in the 
Old Testament frequently represents the Son (Institutes 1.13.13, citing Joel 2.32 
and Proverbs 10.18). He does not contend that the Son and the Father are one in 
person, only that the name which signifies God is applied univocally to both. 




aware that those who read scripture without a guide would not always arrive at 
any notion of the Trinity; for him the Nicene Creed was only one of many 
documents from antiquity that had failed to encapsulate all the prescriptive 
articles of belief.  
 
5. John Milton (1608–1674) 
 
Calvinists in England were always puritans, but not all puritans were Calvinists. 
The poet John Milton, also a keen logician and a formidable student of ancient 
languages, could find no predestination of individuals in his Bible,13 and was 
equally loth to believe that it said anything of Christ which contradicted its clear 
and recurrent testimony to the unity of God. Why should we or the Holy Spirit 
compromise the natural sense of this term with respect to God when we would 
not compromise the natural sense of truth or immortality, omnipresence or 
omniscience? Sonship is certainly ascribed to Jesus, but not an eternal one: if he 
were Son by nature, the natural sense of the word would imply that he cannot 
share the eternity of the Father, for generation is always the bringing into 
existence of that which did not previously exist. (p. 211).  Nor can the Son be of 
one essence with the Father, for difference in number logically necessitates 
difference in essence. This principle, formulated in Milton’s treatise on logic,14 
implies that he understood the term essence only in the Aristotelian sense of 
prime ousia, the concrete individual. If the Son and the Father were coessential, 
which would be Father and which would be Son? If an eternal being can be 
begotten, why should the Father not have his own Father (p. 264)? Scripture 
affords many instances of sonship by adoption, for the elect are sons of God in 
no other sense (pp. 206–208). The passages in which he implies that what is done 
to the saints is done to him are undeniably metonymic, and therefore teach us 
how to read texts in which it might seem that the Son is called Jahweh: while he 
does indeed receive that name by courtesy from time to time, the literal teaching 
of scripture at Exodus 23.21 is that he is not Jahweh but Jahweh is in him (p. 257). 
Honorific metonymy will also explain the Psalmist’s acclamation “Thy throne, O 
God, is for ever and ever”;15 the author to the Hebrews, in applying this verse to 
the Son, builds the rest of his argument on the premise that the Father alone is, 
in the proper sense, God (pp. 240–241). 
Milton’s subordinationism is clearly ontological, and purports to be grounded 
in a consistent reading of the scriptures. It may be that, against his will, he has 
illustrated the impossibility of such a consistent reading. It is natural that a son 
 
13 On Christian Doctrine 1.3, in Milton (1973, 153–167); see also Kelley’s introduction to this 
volume (74–86). 
14 Art of Logic 1.7 in Milton (1982, 233). 
15 Hebrews 1.8, citing Psalm 45.6. 




should be chronologically posterior to his father, but only if his father begets him 
in the course of nature. Once we deny a natural begetting, the consequences of a 
metaphorical usage of the term are less than plain. The plain and natural sense 
of “thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever” is that the addressee is God; most 
probably the Psalm from which the verse is taken employed the name God 
honorifically than literally, but if we are bound to honour the intention of the 
Psalmist, we should resist any Christological application of his conceits. A similar 
paradox arises in Paradise Lost, where God declares to the angels “This day I have 
begot/My only Son”.16 These words from Psalm 2.7 were in the Hebrew text no 
more than a salutation of the king at his enthronement; in Milton they gave the 
same force, as the Son is the creator of the angels and is therefore already begotten 
in the plain and natural sense. Thus the poet exposes the polysemic character of 
the biblical language which in his prose he treats as though it were univocal; not 
does he avoid heresy according to the canons of theology after Nicaea, which 
asserted that the anointing of the Son by the Holy Spirit was coeval with his 
generation, and consequently eternal.17  
In Paradise Lost the humiliation of the Son on earth is freely chosen, but not, it 
appears, from the beginning of his existence. Opposed as Milton was to Calvin’s 
doctrine of individual predestination, he represents the acceptance of the Cross 
as a remedial measure once the the fall of Adam is known to be inevitable:18 the 
Son who is inferior to the Father in rank and essence voluntarily undergoes an 
economic subordination.  Allowance, of course, must be made for the inevitable 
constraints of epic poetry, which is obliged to translate the timeless into the 
temporal and the ineffable into concrete symbolism. Allowance must be made 
again for a tendency to Latinate constructions which leads Milton to say that the 
devil feared no created thing except “God and his Son”,19 which if the literal sense 
were pressed would make the Father himself a creature. But was it only metrical 
exigency that produced the expression “filial Godhead”?20 This ought to mean 
“filial aspect of the one Godhead”, since the notion of a second Godhead 
contravenes the normal use of the term, whether one is a catholic for whom it 
denotes the Trinity or a Unitarian for whom the sole Godhead is the Father. 
Again, Milton is all too clearly aware of his own temerity when he suggests that 
 
16 Paradise Lost 5. 603–605: “This day I have begot whom I declare/My only Son, and on this 
holy hill/Him have anointed whom ye now behold. 
17 See Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Spirit against the Macedonians.  
18 Paradise Lost III.227–265. It is only then, as at Philippians 2.10–12, that the Father commands 
“Adore the Son, and honour him as me” (III.342).  
19 Paradise Lost II, 678–679: “God and his Son except,/Created thing nought valued he nor 
shunned”.  
20 Paradise Lost VI. 719–721: “[H]e all his Father full express’d/Ineffably into his face 
received,/And thus the filial Godhead answering spake.”Cf. Colossians 2.9: “in Christ dwelleth 




light may not be so much the “firstborn of heaven” as a coeternal beam of the 
Eternal.21 He does not identify it with the Son, but he does allow here that one 
attribute of the Father might be shared with another subject—or maybe not 
another, for, as the poet reminds himself and his readers, “God is light”.   
Critics have spoken of latent Arianism in Paradise Lost (cf. Bauman 1987; 
Nuttall 1998); perhaps it would be truer to say that Milton as a poet found it 
difficult to sustain the Arianism that he formulates so rigorously in prose. 
Perhaps, because the poet is bound by more conventions than the writer of prose, 
he cannot be equally intrepid in speculation; perhaps the imagination of a 
Christian recoils from any diminution of the Saviour’s glory, whatever the 
intellect may propound. It may not be irrelevant to note that while the Church of 
England’s liturgy is as reticent as the New Testament in addressing prayers to 
Christ, there has been no want of such devotions in the writings of its poets and 
hymnodists 
 
6. Anglican Speculations 
 
In an enterprising study of Milton’s theology (Hunter 1954), his fellow–
Cantabrigian Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) is adduced as an example of what 
could be tolerated in Protestant divinity of this era. Cudworth, an Anglican cleric, 
was in this and other respects the perfect antitype to Milton. For him, as for all 
the latitudinarians whom we know as the Cambridge Platonists, the assassins of 
faith are Hobbes and Calvin, both of whom impeach the justice of God but their 
fatalism while the former’s materialism robs God of that which makes him God. 
He chooses philosophy rather than theology as his battleground in his Intellectual 
System of the Universe,22 where the atomists—whom he pronounces to be atheists 
to a man, Pythagoreans included– are evidently prototypes of Hobbes. The 
dominant and more genuine strain in Greek thought, represented both in 
popular myth and in its Orphic redactions (II, 73–101), proclaims that God is one 
and that gods are many. In the loftiest of the pagan philosophies, that of Plato, 
the lesser beings owe their divinity to their participation in one first principle. 
His pupil Aristotle endorsed his principles that God is one and that no God can 
be inert (II, 518–524), and hence was rightly understood by the Neoplatonists to 
have followed him in endowing the world with a soul (II, 313).  
While atheists cannot maintain the eternity of the world (I, 301–308), the true 
theist, like Plato, holds it to be a deliberate creation at some point in the past (I, 
493–497). We cannot lay at Plato’s door the ditheism of his late admirer Plutarch, 
 
21 Paradise Lost III.1–3: “Hail, holy light, offspring of Heav’n first–born,/Or of th’ Eternal 
coeternal beam, /May I express thee unblamed? since God is light”, etc. Cf Genesis 1.3, John 8.12, 
1 John 1.5.  
22 Citations are from Cudworth (1820), but the original date of publication is 1678. 




who is consciously original in setting an evil soul in matter against a benign 
world–soul (I, 440–456). The Platonists who followed him were true to their 
founder in admitting no independent principle of evil; and yet they were not so 
much ditheists as tritheists inasmuch as they added the world—perhaps more 
properly the world–soul—to the principles of unity and demiurgic action (III, 43). 
Both this figment and their assertion of three gods or three natures betray an 
adulteration or depravation of the true doctrine (III, 44, 46, 50). At the same time, 
Cudworth argues, the conjunction of the three deities is so intimate that they are 
properly one divine ensemble, even if Neoplatonists could not admit their 
consubstantiality (III, 115–124). Their notions of gradation and dependence 
within the triad have been contrasted with the Christian doctrine of a coequal 
Trinity; all Christians before Nicaea, however, held that the persons differed in 
rank (III, 131), and even for Athanasius homoousiotês connotes not an absolute 
oneness in essence (that is Sabellianism, and a heresy), but equality in the sense 
of possessing “one common or general essence of the Godhead” (p. 166). This is 
compatible with, and indeed entails, the Son’s dependence on the Father (III, 
154); the Platonists shunned the term homoousios only because it seemed to them 
to betoken “three independent and co–ordinate individuals”—an error which 
beguiled even some of the Fathers  (III, 148). Thus the gradation of persons is 
aetiological in both systems, and there is no such disparity between the Platonic 
and the Christian Trinity as is supposed by “some late writers” who mistake the 
Athanasian Creed for a primitive confession (III, 183).  
While it was Platonism that revealed to Cudworth the path between Rome and 
heresy, the Lord Bishop of St David’s came to almost the same opinion through 
an assiduous perusal of the Fathers. George Bull (1634–1710) defended good 
works and free will against self–styled pupils of Augustine, but the work of his 
life to prove that the Church of England, not the Church of Rome, had preserved 
the legacy of the Fathers.23 His Roman interlocutor, Dionysius Petavius, (1583–
1652) maintained that by admitting the authority of four oecumenical councils, 
the English divines had confessed that a teaching might be prescriptive even if it 
were not primitive, and hence they must confess the necessity of some institution 
to oversee the unfolding of the true doctrine. Bull’s response is to forestall the 
inference by demonstrating the falsehood of the premise: in his submission, as in 
its own, the Nicene Council affirmed no other Creed than that which had been 
passed down from apostolic times in every quarter of the Christian world. While 
it might seem, for example, that to teach the Son’s coeternity with the Father was 
to contradict Psalm 2.7 “thou art my son, this day gave I begotten thee“ the 
tradition before Nicaea had already observed that the first clause says “Thou art”, 
not “Thou hast become”, thus intimating that, whatever the begetting may be, 
 




the Sonship is eternal (p. 545). Begetting is thus construed as enthronement, in 
keeping with the intent of the Psalmist, as we observed with respect to Milton.  
And as we also observed, the apology is incomplete, for post–Nicene orthodoxy 
taught that the Son’s anointing is as eternal as his generation; Bull’s aim, 
however, is to vindicate the consistency of patristic teaching, not to answer every 
objection that an Arian might raise against the Creed. 
Neither the divinity nor the consubstantiality of the Son are admitted by Bull 
to be innovations. It is all the more remarkable then, and was prejudicial to his 
own reputation for orthodoxy, that he should not hold the equality of the Son 
and the Father to be a catholic doctrine originating with the apostles. His 
argument, in a sequel to his Defence of the Nicene Faith, is that the subordination 
of the Son to the Father was not only the common tenet of the church before 
Nicaea, but is presupposed by the Nicene Creed itself and by its most esteemed 
interpreters in the following century. He maintains in all three theses: that the 
Creed ratified the antecedent doctrine of subordination and was generally 
understood to do so (p. 686); that the doctrine was asserted of the Son as Second 
Person of the Trinity and not only as Christ incarnate (p. 704); and that the 
salutary consequence of the doctrine is to confirm all the divine attributes of the 
Son without depriving the Father of his pre–eminence as the one true God (p. 
767). The first two theses required to produce testimonies not known from 
theologians before Nicaea ( as in the Defence) but from Athanasius, Nazianzen. 
Cyril and Augustine, the recognised arbiters of the Council’s meaning; at the 
same time, the most cogent proofs from scripture are furnished by Origen, of 
whose orthodoxy Bull entertains no doubt (pp. 716–719; 741–756). His 
adversaries grant it when, instead of decrying Origen’s designation of the Father 
as autotheos, they pretend that he applies this epithet also to the Son (pp. 701–
702). That councils purporting to be oecumenical, and theologians echoing these 
councils, have maintained the equality of the Son and the Father Bull does not 
wish to dispute; on the contrary, this is evidence of the incapacity of the Roman 
church to preserve sound teachings. The claim of Petavius, that every council 
improves and corrects the decrees of its predecessor, is clearly belied by the 
dissensions of the schoolmen, who present such a sorry contrast to the unanimity 
of the ancient church. 
Working from the Fathers, therefore, Bull comes to the same conclusion as 
Calvin, who accepts no rule but scripture, as Cudworth in his search for an 
alliance between the gospel and philosophy, and as Milton the epic poet in 
contrast to Milton the theologian. He injured his own good name by his use of 
the term subordination, which he might have eschewed in good faith; his learned 
proof that not every subordinationist is an Arian may have tempted a younger 
Anglican, Samuel Clarke into opinions that were thought to savour of this heresy 
(Clarke 1712). The second–hand quotations from the Fathers which acquitted 




Clarke could not help the Socinians,24 who denied the existence of any Second 
Person other than the incarnate. The English law of blasphemy which 
pronounces this a crime is now a dead letter; denial of the Trinity, on the other 
hand, was long ago removed from the statute,25 perhaps because Bull had 




Anyone who compares the opening section of this paper with those that follow 
may be surprised that the equality of the Son and the Father became an all but 
universal dogma despite the silence, or some would say the explicit resistance, of 
the scriptures. The texts that were thought to attribute divinity to the Son are 
dubious, and not every use of theos betokened parity with the Father; on the other 
hand, no syntactic ambiguity occludes his own saying “the Father is greater than 
I” (John 14.28). The Nicene Creed none the less denies the ontological primacy of 
the Father; Athanasius, the Cappadocians and Augustine (in contrast to Origen) 
deny even his axiological primacy. The Conciliar tradition remains more reticent: 
the redaction of the Nicene Creed in 381 does not explicitly state that the persons 
are equal in rank, and makes the Father alone the source of the Spirit without 
affirming that the Spirit is also God (cf. Bindley 1906, 69–92; Smith 2019, 26–27). 
The tenets that all three persons are God and that all are one God, are enunciated 
clearly in the Athanasian Creed, a Latin document, which governs the exegesis 
not only of Calvin (who avowedly put on Augustinian spectacles to read Paul) 
but of the Platonizing Cudworth and of Bishop Bull, who sets no ancient master 
above the rest. Even the indomitable Milton cannot sustain in his published epic 
the sceptical thoughts that he whispered in Latin: we surmised above that the 
cause of his inconsistency was the popular adoration of Christ, which had been 
a source of power to Athanasius. What after all, says the common sense of the 
churches, is the meaning of the name Christian if Christ comes second to some 
other object of worship? 
Some ask why we need a doctrine of the Trinity if the New Testament is not a 
theological tract but a manual of life, with Christ at its centre. Athanasius would 
reply that without a true understanding of the Son’s oneness with the Father, we 
cannot unseal the charter that binds creation to redemption, we cannot decide 
the indicatives of the Old Testament which underlie the imperatives of the New. 
And yet it is far from obvious that an indicative which excludes subordination is 
the best warrant for imperatives which are grounded in the belief that the Son 
gave up his life at the bidding of the Father and was raised up by the Father for 
our salvation. What do we profit by being told that the Son who obeyed the will 
 
24 Wiles (1994) is often speaking of Socinians rather than true Arians. 




of the Father even to the Cross is so far from being his natural servant that it 
might logically have been the Father himself who endured this death? The 
modern aphorism that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity reaffirms the 
principle of Luther and Schleiermacher (which seems also to have been that of 
Athanasius) that what we know of God is what God reveals and that he reveals 
it for our sake.  
On this presupposition Karl Rahner argues that the Son within the Trinity is 
eternally predisposed to be the image of the Father, which is to say that he is (as 
Justin averred) the more knowable, even if we add against Justin that he is so by 
his own volition, not by nature.26 In one of his essays Rahner demonstrates that 
the Father is the typical, if not the only referent of the noun theos in the New 
Testament (cf. Rahner 1961, 79–148),27 and his thesis will also commend itself to 
those who hold that the proper subject of the Johannine prologue is not so much 
eternal Sonship as perennial revelation (cf. Ashton 1998, 5–35). Karl Barth, who 
has said with even greater force that we know the Trinity only through the 
incarnation, argues that the purpose of God was to elect us to fellowship with 
him, and that since we are elected through Christ in his death his subordination 
to this decree is not a supervenient but an eternal corollary of his sonship (cf. 
Barth 1956, 52–54, 104). In short, he has been eternally the one who obeys the 
Father, albeit not in any sense that precludes the co–operation of his own will. 
Since neither of these theories asserts the Son’s inferiority to the Father in 
power or in nature, neither can be said to teach the doctrine for which Arius was 
condemned, or even that which is implied by certain texts on Origen. Before we 
tax Barth with novelty, let alone heresy, we should note that in Irenaeus also 
election precedes creation (Against Heresies 3.22). At the same time we may feel 
that both invite Eusebius’ criticism of Arius by making too much of that which 
the Bible has chosen to leave unsaid.28 Certainly we should hesitate to assert that 
God in himself is other than that which he has revealed himself to be; on the other 
hand, to assert that he must be exactly as he reveals himself is to abridge his 
freedom and exaggerate the human capacity for understanding. If God is indeed 
ineffable, as all champions of the Nicene Creed asseverate, we must deal warily 
even with the cataphatic, or affirmative, testimonies of scripture; the virtue of the 
apophatic way which complements this in Christian thought is not that it yields 
a truer set of propositions, but that it warns us not to imagine that theology can 




26 See Rahner (1967, esp. 78–88) with Wong (1984). 
27 “Theos in the New Testament”, in Theological Investigations I (London: Darton, Longman and 
Todd 1961), 79–148.  
28 Letter of Eusebius to Caesarea, in Theodoret, Church History 1.12,15.  
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